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Spatial correlationThis paper measures the productive efﬁciency of municipal solid waste (MSW) logistics by applying data
envelopment analysis (DEA) to cross-sectional data of prefectures in Japan. Either through public operations
or by outsourcing to private waste collection operators, prefectural governments possess the fundamental
authority over waste processing operations in Japan. Therefore, we estimate a multi-input multi-output pro-
duction efﬁciency at the prefectural level via DEA, employing several different model settings. Our data clas-
sify the MSW into household solid waste (HSW) and business solid waste (BSW) collected by both private
and public operators as separate outputs, while the numbers of trucks and workers used by private and
public operators are used as inputs. The results consistently show that geographical characteristics, such as
the number of inhabited remote islands, are relatively more dominant factors for determining inefﬁciency.
While the implication that a minimum efﬁcient scale is not achieved in these small islands is in line with
the literature suggesting that waste logistics has increasing returns at the municipal level, our results indicate
that waste collection efﬁciency in Japan is well described by CRS technology at the prefectural level. The
results also show that prefectures with higher private-sector participation, measured in terms of HSW collec-
tion, are more efﬁcient, whereas a higher private–labor ratio negatively affects efﬁciency. We also provide
evidence that prefectures with inefﬁcient MSW logistics have a higher tendency of suffering from the illegal
dumping of industrial waste.
© 2013 International Association of Trafﬁc and Safety Sciences. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd.
All rights reserved.1. Introduction
History has shown that the inevitable consequence of economic
growth is increasing waste. Waste, often dubbed as the “third pollu-
tion,” requires attention similar to air or water pollution.2 However,r helpful comments and sug-
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s the third pollution.
ssociation of Trafﬁc and Safety Scthe waste processing industry, as well as households' decision-making
processes regardingwaste creation, appears to be subject tomarket dis-
tortions, such as hidden subsidies, ad-hoc regulations and inefﬁcient
public operations.3 When the market fails to discipline the industry,
benchmarking and measuring efﬁciency of behaviors by decision-
making units in the industry become important. In terms of cost,
waste collection is the major component of municipal solid waste
processing. For example, 74.7% of the total cost is due to waste collec-
tion in the metropolitan area of Tokyo.4
Nonetheless, it appears that not many economists have realized the
importance of waste collection because the literature on this issue is
very limited. Hirsh [7] was one of the ﬁrst empirical studies to concen-
trate on the cost of waste collection, focusing on 25 cities near Saint
Louis in the US. Following Hirsh's seminal work, Stevens [6] and
Dubin and Navarro [13] studied larger samples in the US and showed
empirical evidence of economies of scale [13] and economies of density3 See Porter [10] for further discussion.
4 Ministry of the Environment of Japan (http://www.env.go.jp/recycle/waste_tech/
ippan/h21/data/shori/total/05.xls). The national average of the cost share of municipal
solid waste collection in Japan is 47.5%. See Banker et al. [2] for further evidence out-
side of Japan.
iences. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Table 1
Summary statistics for original data.
Source: Ministry of Environment.
Variable Mean (Std. dev.) Min. Max. N
Household waste
(public)
229,074.4043 (440,209.5879) 1909 2,495,407 47
Household waste
(private)
386,883.5319 (310,810.5789) 36,961 1,410,292 47
Business waste
(public)
1310.234 (2460.9322) 0 13,260 47
Business waste
(private)
225,617.1489 (253,175.9074) 35,168 1,309,818 47
Numbers of trucks
(public)
290.6383 (372.0159) 19 1773 47
Numbers of trucks
(private)
3483.4255 (2726.7394) 550 13,067 47
Numbers of workers
(public)
608.7447 (1060.5821) 17 5319 47
Numbers of workers
(private)
4617.4468 (3220.6792) 1100 14,920 47
Unit for waste: tons.
99D. Ichinose et al. / IATSS Research 36 (2013) 98–105[6]; Yamamoto [15] mostly conﬁrmed similar cost structures for Japa-
nese data.
While these previous papers are based on parametric analysis, this
paper measures the productive efﬁciency of solid waste logistics in
Japan by applying various data envelopment analysis (DEA) models
to cross-sectional data at the prefecture level. DEA, pioneered by Farrel
[4], is one of the primary methodologies in estimating multi-output
multi-input production efﬁciency. DEA nonparametrically identiﬁes
the production possibility frontier and then measures the inefﬁciency
of each DMU as the distance to the frontier.5 A number of studies
have adopted DEA in measuring efﬁciency for various industries, such
as banking and transportation.6 However, the literature on efﬁciency
measurements in the reverse-logistics industry is limited.
The results consistently show that the set of underperforming
prefectures is similar among different model settings, with Ehime
being the most inefﬁcient prefecture, closely followed by Nagasaki.
Our list of underperforming prefectures indicates that small inhabited
islands are overrepresented; therefore, geographical characteristics ap-
pear to be a major factor determining the efﬁciency of these
underperforming prefectures. Ehime, for example, has 33 islands in its
jurisdiction, with an average population of 525 and an average area of
2.71 km2 per island. This production size is too small to achieve the
minimum efﬁcient scale in waste collection because, as shown by the
literature, increasing-return technology is implemented at
themunicipal level.7 At the same time, our results indicate that the pro-
duction technology has constant returns to scale at the prefecture level.
In addition to geographic inﬂuences, our results show that prefec-
tures with a higher private sector participation, measured in terms
of household solid waste collection, are more efﬁcient, even though
the labor ratio of the private sector negatively affects the efﬁciency.
Through a spatial econometric analysis, we also provide evidence
that prefectures with inefﬁcient MSW logistics have a higher correla-
tion with the volume of illegal dumping of industrial waste.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our data.
Section 3 provides various DEA productive efﬁciency measurement
results. In Section 4, we analyze the obtained results for the reverse-
logistics industry in Japan. Finally, Section 5 concludes.2. Data
In this paper, we classify solid waste into four categories. Data
provided by the Ministry of the Environment of Japan categorizes mu-
nicipal solid waste (MSW) into two types: namely household solid
waste (HSW) and business solid waste (BSW). In addition, there are
two types of operators, public and private, to collect the waste. The
municipalities in Japan are responsible for taking the necessary ac-
tions to properly manage their municipal solid waste, as stipulated
by Article 4 of the Waste Management and Public Cleansing Law.8
However, a notiﬁcation by the Ministry of Environment to prefectural
governments states that each prefecture is responsible for supervising
the entire waste-processing plan by providing adequate advice and
instructions to its municipalities and ensuring that they submit
solid waste processing plans and revisions when they impose or
revise their plans.9 Thus, while private waste collection operators
are consigned, contracted, or licensed by a local government, they
must, for example, notify the prefectural governments about waste-
processing operations or obtain permission from them. Given that
the prefectural government is in charge of monitoring the entire solid5 For details, see for example, Yamaguchi and Yoshida [1].
6 Oum et al. [9] provide a comprehensive overview of the efﬁciency measurement
literature in the transportation sector.
7 See Yamamoto [15].
8 See http://www.env.go.jp/en/laws/recycle/01.pdf.
9 Published in 1977, revised in 1990. See http://www.env.go.jp/hourei/syousai.php?
id=11000014.waste processing operation, we measure the productive efﬁciency of
solid waste collection at the prefectural level.
It is safe to assume that these public and private operators deal
with different production technologies. For example, while private
operators collect both HSW and BSW, public operators tend to con-
centrate on the collection of HSW. Thus, in our analysis we treat
waste differently, not only according to the type of waste but also
according to the type of operators who collect the waste. Our data
set contains the number of trucks used as capital input and the num-
ber of workers as labor input for each public and private operator
separately; the data were made available by the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment of Japan. Thus, we have four outputs and four inputs to char-
acterize the production technology of waste collection.
Our data set is a cross section of the ﬁscal year 2009 data made
available by the Ministry of the Environment of Japan. It contains
eight variables, four of which are outputs and four are inputs, as men-
tioned above, for all 47 prefectures in Japan.10 Table 1 presents the
summary statistics for the data.
The outputs are the volumes of HSW and BSW collected. Figs. 1
and 2 display these output data on the map of Japan. As shown on
the maps, more waste is generated in more populated areas. This ten-
dency is much more obvious for BSW in Fig. 2 because BSW mostly
consists of waste from restaurants, schools and business ofﬁces, which
are usually agglomerated in metropolitan areas, such as Tokyo.
The inputs are capital and labor, in terms of numbers of trucks
and workers employed, measured separately for public and private
operators. Fig. 3 provides two partial-factor productivity measures,
namely volumes of waste processed per truck and per worker. It is
clear that public and private operations use quite different production
technology with stark contrasts in their partial-factor productivity.
The average and standard deviations of partial-factor productivity
for public and private operations are presented in Table 2, which re-
jects the null hypothesis of equal means for both volume per truck
and volume per worker.11 Our separate treatment of the public and
private sectors stems from this observation.
As indicated by Yamamoto [15], reverse logistics production tech-
nology exhibits increasing return to scale at the municipal level but
does not necessarily at the prefectural level. Subsequently, we will
therefore conduct two separate DEA analyses for both cases of IRS and
CRS production technology; namely, ﬁrst by assuming that the produc-
tion possibility set is convex without any normalization of the original
data, and second, by preparing the original data to consider potential
non-convexity due to increasing-return production technology.10 Fiscal year 2009 starts in April 2009 and ends in 2010 March.
11 The z score is 7.67 for the volume per truck and 11.18 for the volume per worker.
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Fig. 3. Amount of HSW/BSW per unit by type of organization.
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Fig. 2. Amount of BSW generation by prefecture.
Table 2
Averages and standard deviations of partial-factor productivity for public and private
operators.
Volume/truck Volume/worker
Public private Public private
Average 625.37 199.73 362.22 141.31
Std. dev. 365.59 104.72 120.59 61.81
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3.1. DEA estimation with the assumption of a convex production possibility
set
We run DEA estimations on the data shown in Table 1 (above)
both with CRS and VRS assumptions.12 For the case of VRS, we mea-
sure efﬁciency for both input and output orientations.13 By DEA, the
CRS efﬁciency of prefecture j, denoted by θj, is measured as
θj ¼ minθ
s:t:∑
j˜∈J
λ j˜ Ki; j˜ ≤ θKi; j
∑
j˜∈J
λ j˜ Ki; j˜ ≤ θLi; j
∑
j˜∈J
λ j˜ Ki; j˜ ≤Hi; j
∑
j˜∈J
λ j˜ Ki; j˜ ≤ Bi; j
λ j˜ ≥0∀ j˜∈J
for i∈ {public, private}where J is the set of 47 prefectures, andHi,j and Bi,j
are, respectively, the volumes of HSW and BSW collected in prefecture j12 It may be natural to assume separability between public and private production;
however, we do not a priori impose such restrictions on our estimation model.
13 By construction of DEA, assuming CRS efﬁciency takes the same value in either
orientation.by operator i. To make it an input-oriented VRS efﬁciency measure, we
simply add a constraint∑j˜∈Jλj˜ ¼ 1 to the above linear programming
problem. The output-oriented VRS efﬁciency is obtained by using θ
above as the coefﬁcients ofMi,j and using Bi,j instead of Ki,j and Li,j.
Table 3 provides the efﬁciency scores under these different model
settings.
The least efﬁcient prefecture is Ehime, closely followed by Nagasaki.
These two prefectures appear in this order in all different model
settings. Moreover, most of the underperforming prefectures appear
repeatedly in the group of the 10 least-efﬁcient DMUs in these dif-
ferent model settings. As shown in Table 4, these are Kagawa, Iwate,
Yamaguchi, Okayama, Toyama, and Shizuoka prefectures, in addi-
tion to Ehime and Nagasaki.
The result that the scale efﬁciency is very close, if not equal, to unity
formost of the DMUs implies that the production technology is well de-
scribed as CRS.14 Indeed, the correlation between the CRS efﬁciency
scores and the input-oriented VRS efﬁciency scores is 0.884, while the
correlation between the CRS and the output-oriented VRS efﬁciency
scores is 0.900. There are six prefectures that are technically efﬁcient
but with a scale efﬁciency less than unity. Of these prefectures, Yamaga-
ta, Nara, Tokushima, and Kochi exhibit local increasing returns, whereas
Tochigi and Aichi lie on the frontier where local returns are decreasing.
The former four prefectures have a smaller population size and thus a
smaller production scale of MSW collection, whereas Tochigi and
Aichi have a larger population and production size.
Table 5 provides the referencing peers under the CRS assumption.
Referencing peers provide the information as to which prefectures the
inefﬁcient prefecture is referencing in deriving its efﬁciency score, and
shows to what direction, as a linear combination or “average” of these14 The average scale efﬁciency is 0.974 for the input-oriented VRS model and 0.976
for the output-oriented VRS model.
Table 3
DEA results with original data.
Prefecture CRS VRS input-oriented VRS output-oriented
Technical Scale Local
return
Technical Scale Local
return
Hokkaido 0.740 0.954 0.776 DRS 0.973 0.761 DRS
Aomori 0.834 0.843 0.989 IRS 0.836 0.998 IRS
Iwate 0.756 0.768 0.984 DRS 0.780 0.968 DRS
Miyagi 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Akita 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Yamagata 0.989 1.000 0.989 IRS 1.000 0.989 IRS
Fukushima 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Ibaraki 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Tochigi 0.961 1.000 0.961 DRS 1.000 0.961 DRS
Gunma 0.882 0.897 0.983 DRS 0.903 0.976 DRS
Saitama 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Chiba 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Tokyo 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Kanagawa 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Niigata 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000
Toyama 0.811 0.814 0.996 IRS 0.811 0.999 IRS
Ishikawa 0.834 0.961 0.868 IRS 0.949 0.879 IRS
Fukui 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Yamanashi 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Nagano 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Gihu 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Shizuoka 0.834 0.854 0.977 DRS 0.860 0.970 DRS
Aichi 0.995 1.000 0.995 DRS 1.000 0.995 DRS
Mie 0.877 0.893 0.982 DRS 0.900 0.975 DRS
Shiga 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Kyoto 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Osaka 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Hyogo 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Nara 0.866 1.000 0.866 IRS 1.000 0.866 IRS
Wakayama 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Tottori 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Shimane 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Okayama 0.805 0.823 0.978 IRS 0.805 1.000 –
Hiroshima 0.923 0.925 0.998 IRS 0.923 1.000 –
Yamaguchi 0.804 0.821 0.980 DRS 0.831 0.968 DRS
Tokushima 0.941 1.000 0.941 IRS 1.000 0.941 IRS
Kagawa 0.732 0.883 0.830 IRS 0.837 0.875 IRS
Ehime 0.634 0.638 0.994 DRS 0.645 0.983 DRS
Kochi 0.937 1.000 0.937 IRS 1.000 0.937 IRS
Fukuoka 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Saga 0.842 0.951 0.886 IRS 0.862 0.976 IRS
Nagasaki 0.646 0.648 0.997 IRS 0.667 0.969 DRS
Kumamoto 0.976 0.990 0.986 DRS 0.990 0.986 DRS
Oita 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Miyazaki 0.856 0.961 0.891 IRS 0.949 0.902 IRS
Kagoshima 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Okinawa 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
101D. Ichinose et al. / IATSS Research 36 (2013) 98–105peers, it should improve. For example, Hokkaido's efﬁciency score is
obtained as 74% of the “average” of Fukui, Akita, Tokyo, Kagoshima,
Gifu, and Yamanashi. As the table shows, the set of referencing peers
does not possess geographical proximity as a common factor. Besides,
Tokyo appears as a peer for 16 prefectures. This is due to its largest
scale of production and many peers are falling within its umbrella.Table 4
List of 10 most underperforming prefectures.
CRS VRS input-oriented VRS output-oriented
Least efﬁcient Ehime Ehime Ehime
2nd least efﬁcient Nagasaki Nagasaki Nagasaki
3rd least efﬁcient Kagawa Iwate Iwate
4th least efﬁcient Hokkaido Toyama Okayama
5th least efﬁcient Iwate Yamaguchi Toyama
6th least efﬁcient Yamaguchi Okayama Yamaguchi
7th least efﬁcient Okayama Aomori Aomori
8th least efﬁcient Toyama Shizuoka Kagawa
9th least efﬁcient Shizuoka Kagawa Shizuoka
10th least efﬁcient Ishikawa Mie Saga
Note: Prefectures in bold face appear in all columns.More prominent is the Gifu prefecture that is referenced 18 times.
Given that Gifu is neither very large nor small in production size, and
that its input and output mix is not particularly different from others,
the fact that Gifu is referenced bymany prefectures implies that its pro-
duction efﬁciency is relatively competitive.
3.2. Modiﬁed DEA estimation with the increasing-return production
technology assumption
We now prepare our data by taking a log to be in line with the
assumption of the convex production possibility set that is necessary
in DEA estimations.15 We refer to this DEA estimation using these
data as modiﬁed DEA. Table 6 shows the estimation results.
Table 7 presents the list of the 10 least-efﬁcient prefectures in the re-
sults from the modiﬁed DEA, under the assumptions of input-oriented
VRS, output-oriented VRS, and CRS, for each column respectively. As
seen in Table 7, the set of the 10 most-inefﬁcient DMUs is the same
under the two VRS assumptions. Moreover, the set is again similar
to those sets in the original DEA presented in Table 4 because all of
those eight prefectures mentioned in Section 1 that appear repeatedly
among the group of the 10 least-efﬁcient DMUs still appear in this list
for VRS assumptions.
The results obtained with the CRS assumption in this modiﬁed DEA
analysis are quite different from the results with VRS assumptions as
well as from those in the original DEA analysis. For example, Tokyo ap-
pears among the 10 least-efﬁcient prefectures, whereas its partial-factor
productivity measures are relatively high compared to other prefec-
tures. This result indicates that, due to the data modiﬁcation we made
by taking a log, the CRS assumption is no longer appropriate.16
As shown in Table 6, most of the DMUs with a scale efﬁciency of
less than unity lie on the section of the production possibility frontier
where the local returns to scale are decreasing. The above-mentioned
log conversion of input and output data increases the output–input
ratio of DMUs with a small production scale. By adopting the CRS
assumption for this converted data set, the DEA results in a poor
representation of the production possibility frontier if the production
technology in the original data exhibits slightly increasing returns;
hence, an overestimation of inefﬁciency, especially for those DMUs
with a higher production scale, such as Tokyo, is observed. This result
is conﬁrmed in Table 6 such that all four technically efﬁcient prefec-
tures exhibiting IRS with scale efﬁciency less than unity in the DEA
using original data now all appear to be scale efﬁcient. Moreover, 15
technically efﬁcient prefectures with relatively large production
scales are now listed as scale inefﬁcient, exhibiting DRS, in contrast
to only two prefectures in the case of the DEA using the original
data as mentioned in Section 3.1.
For both DEA models using the original and modiﬁed data, it has
been found that those DMUs that are technically efﬁcient are indeed
allocatively efﬁcient in the sense that they do not incur input or out-
put slacks. As Ferrier and Lovell [5] argue that the slack is essentially
be viewed as allocative efﬁciency, this implies that those DMUs that
are technically efﬁcient are also allocatively efﬁcient.
4. Policy implications and discussions
4.1. Implications for efﬁciency
We begin by deriving geographical implications from our analysis
above on the reverse-logistics industry in Japan. As can be seen in15 As mentioned earlier, public operators collect little BSW, and in some prefectures
the volume is zero. We address this issue by adding 1 to all data before computing their
natural logs.
16 To the best of our knowledge there is no existing literature arguing the generally ac-
cepted procedures to compare the two DEA models discussed here. We therefore limit
ourselves to the heuristic argument of such technical difference and its implication.
Table 5
Referencing peers of original DATA DEA analysis under CRS assumption.
Prefecture Peers
Hokkaido Fukui Akita Tokyo Kagoshima Gifu Yamanashi
Aomori Fukushima Niigata Tokyo Nagano Fukuoka
Iwate Fukui Gifu Akita Tokyo Yamanashi
Miyagi Miyagi
Akita Akita
Yamagata Fukushima
Fukushima Fukushima
Ibaraki Ibaraki
Tochigi Kagoshima Gifu Fukui Tokyo
Gunma Shiga Chiba Yamanashi Akita Gifu
Saitama Saitama
Chiba Chiba
Tokyo Tokyo
Kanagawa Kanagawa
Niigata Niigata
Toyama Tokyo Yamanashi Gifu Kagoshima
Ishikawa Fukui Tokyo Akita Chiba
Fukui Fukui
Yamanashi Yamanashi
Nagano Nagano
Gifu Gifu
Shizuoka Fukui Tokyo Gifu Chiba
Aichi Oita Gifu Tokyo
Mie Gifu Oita
Shiga Shiga
Kyoto Kyoto
Osaka Osaka
Hyogo Hyogo
Nara Wakayama Gifu Osaka Kanagawa
Wakayama Wakayama
Tottori Tottori Shimane Shimane
Okayama Hyogo Chiba Gifu
Hiroshima Gifu Hyogo Chiba
Yamaguchi Tokyo Gifu Oita
Tokushima Tokyo Gifu Kanagawa
Kagawa Hyogo Chiba Tokyo Gifu
Ehime Gifu Ibaraki Yamanashi Fukui Tokyo
Kochi Oita Tokyo Gifu
Fukuoka Fukuoka
Saga Tokyo Yamanashi Kagoshima Fukui
Nagasaki Oita Tokyo Kagoshima
Kumamoto Gifu Kagoshima Tokyo Fukui
Oita Oita
Miyazaki Chiba Osaka Gifu
Kagoshima Kagoshima
Okinawa Okinawa
102 D. Ichinose et al. / IATSS Research 36 (2013) 98–105Fig. 4, spatial correlation of efﬁciency is hardly observed regarding the
efﬁciency results (CRS with original data). More concretely, a global
spatial relationship can be described by Moran's I; it is 0.09801, which
is low enough to conclude that there is no signiﬁcant spatial autocorre-
lation among prefectures.17
Thus, our attention should be focused more on a local spatial
feature. We speciﬁcally analyze the causes of local inefﬁciency by
running Tobit regressions of the estimated efﬁciency scores on inde-
pendent variables, such as public participation ratios measured by
public shares of HSW collection and labor inputs, the number of
inhabited islands, pavement ratios, and population density.18 The re-
sults are shown in Table 8 and the data for the independent variables
are listed in Table 9. We discuss the implications of these variables on
the efﬁciency of solid waste collection in turn.17 We use the spatial weight matrix, which is deﬁned by the inverse of the square of
distance between the capital cities of prefectures i and j.
18 Efﬁciency scores measured in the previous section are inverted by taking a log and
multiplying by −1 to represent the inefﬁciency before running the Tobit regressions.
The public share of BSW and the ratio of the number of trucks used in public operations
are omitted due to their high correlation with the public share of HSW and the ratio of
the number of workers in public operations, respectively, to avoid multicolinearity.4.2. Geographical characteristics and efﬁciency
As indicated in the above regression results, the ﬁrst and foremost
of the potential causes of the inefﬁciency results is the larger number
of small, isolated islands in the jurisdiction. The small population size
of these islands makes it difﬁcult to achieve the minimum efﬁcient
scale of waste collection. The average land area of inhabited islands
in the Ehime prefecture is as small as 2.71 km2, and the average
population is merely 525 residents per island, resulting in the lowest
efﬁciency.19 In addition to Ehime, prefectures such as Nagasaki,
Yamaguchi, Kagawa, and Okayama, which are listed among the 10
least-efﬁcient DMUs in Tables 4 and 7, have many isolated islands in
their administrative districts, as shown in Table 10.
For example, Nagasaki has the largest number of inhabited islands
(54 islands), Ehime has the third-largest number of isolated islands
(33 islands), and Kagawa, Yamaguchi and Okayama also have a19 The population density is not necessarily smaller on these islands. Ehime prefec-
ture [3] shows that the average population density on these islands is 224/km2 in
2002, which is comparable to the population density of the entire Ehime prefecture
(263/km2), or even to that of all of Japan at 342/km2 (source: Statistics Bureau, Minis-
try of Internal Affairs and Communications (2006), World Statistics (Sekaino Tokei)).
Table 6
Modiﬁed DEA results with data modiﬁed for the increasing-return production tech-
nology assumption.
Prefecture CRS VRS input-oriented VRS output-oriented
Technical Scale Local
return
Technical Scale Local
return
Hokkaido 0.900 1.000 0.900 DRS 1.000 0.900 DRS
Aomori 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Iwate 0.952 0.969 0.983 DRS 0.984 0.967 DRS
Miyagi 0.953 1.000 0.953 DRS 1.000 0.953 DRS
Akita 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Yamagata 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Fukushima 0.970 1.000 0.970 DRS 1.000 0.970 DRS
Ibaraki 0.950 1.000 0.950 DRS 1.000 0.950 DRS
Tochigi 0.925 0.999 0.926 DRS 1.000 0.926 DRS
Gunma 0.953 0.990 0.962 DRS 0.994 0.959 DRS
Saitama 0.939 1.000 0.939 DRS 1.000 0.939 DRS
Chiba 0.954 1.000 0.954 DRS 1.000 0.954 DRS
Tokyo 0.936 1.000 0.936 DRS 1.000 0.936 DRS
Kanagawa 0.944 1.000 0.944 DRS 1.000 0.944 DRS
Niigata 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Toyama 0.965 0.977 0.988 DRS 0.986 0.979 DRS
Ishikawa 0.999 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Fukui 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Yamanashi 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Nagano 0.968 1.000 0.968 DRS 1.000 0.968 DRS
Gihu 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Shizuoka 0.924 0.981 0.942 DRS 0.990 0.933 DRS
Aichi 0.929 1.000 0.929 DRS 1.000 0.929 DRS
Mie 0.897 0.976 0.919 DRS 0.988 0.907 DRS
Shiga 0.994 1.000 0.994 DRS 1.000 0.994 DRS
Kyoto 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Osaka 0.989 1.000 0.989 DRS 1.000 0.989 DRS
Hyogo 0.943 1.000 0.943 DRS 1.000 0.943 DRS
Nara 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Wakayama 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Tottori 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Shimane 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Okayama 0.957 0.966 0.991 DRS 0.981 0.976 DRS
Hiroshima 0.947 0.984 0.962 DRS 0.992 0.955 DRS
Yamaguchi 0.914 0.970 0.942 DRS 0.985 0.928 DRS
Tokushima 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Kagawa 0.968 0.968 1.000 – 0.978 0.989 DRS
Ehime 0.907 0.924 0.982 DRS 0.962 0.943 DRS
Kochi 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Fukuoka 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
Saga 0.997 0.997 1.000 – 0.997 1.000 –
Nagasaki 0.907 0.931 0.974 DRS 0.964 0.942 DRS
Kumamoto 0.964 0.995 0.969 DRS 0.997 0.967 DRS
Oita 0.954 1.000 0.954 DRS 1.000 0.954 DRS
Miyazaki 0.978 0.978 0.999 IRS 0.983 0.995 DRS
Kagoshima 0.967 1.000 0.967 DRS 1.000 0.967 DRS
Okinawa 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 –
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
DEA scores (original, CRS)
Fig. 4. DEA results by prefecture (original data, CRS).
Table 7
List of the 10 most-underperforming prefectures in the modiﬁed DEA results.
VRS input-oriented VRS output-oriented CRS
Least efﬁcient Ehime Ehime Mie
2nd least efﬁcient Nagasaki Nagasaki Hokkaido
3rd least efﬁcient Okayama Kagawa Nagasaki
4th least efﬁcient Kagawa Okayama Ehime
5th least efﬁcient Iwate Miyazaki Yamaguchi
6th least efﬁcient Yamaguchi Iwate Shizuoka
7th least efﬁcient Mie Yamaguchi Tochigi
8th least efﬁcient Toyama Toyama Aichi
9th least efﬁcient Miyazaki Mie Tokyo
10th least efﬁcient Shizuoka Shizuoka Saitama
103D. Ichinose et al. / IATSS Research 36 (2013) 98–105large number of inhabited islands with a smaller island population
size. There are several prefectures, such as Okinawa and Kagoshima,
that achieve higher productive efﬁciency in waste collection despite
their relatively high number of islands. However, the average land
area and population per island for Kagoshima, for example, is
89.4 km2 and 6522 residents, respectively, which is ten times or more
than Ehime's averages. As such, we conclude that the inefﬁciency of
solid waste logistics is explained by the number of isolated islands
that are smaller than what is necessary to achieve the minimum efﬁ-
cient scale.20
Another possible cause for the inefﬁciency in reverse logistics
is the low pavement ratio of main roads; even though the signs
are not signiﬁcant, they are consistently negative. In fact, among the
inefﬁcient DMUs listed in Tables 4 and 7, Iwate has the worst pave-
ment ratio, and Toyama's pavement ratio is the fourth lowest from20 Naturally, “what is the minimum efﬁcient scale of solid waste collection?” is the next
question to be investigated, which is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future
research.the bottom.21 In addition, the population density of these two prefec-
tures is relatively low, implying a longer trip distance per volume.
These factors together resulted in low efﬁciency for the Iwate and
Toyama prefectures.4.3. Public and private operation ratios and efﬁciency
We now discuss the relationship between the efﬁciency of solid
waste logistics and public operations, i.e., the private participation.
As seen in Table 8, the results among different models consistently
show that a lower public operation ratio measured in terms of the
volume of HSWhas a positive effect on efﬁciency. This ﬁnding appears
to support the recent recommendation of encouraging private partic-
ipation to improve efﬁciency.22 However, the results also show that
prefectures with higher private worker ratios are inefﬁcient, which
implies that the naïve introduction of private participation may not
necessarily increase efﬁciency and that contracting with or licensing
private operators with high productivity is critical.4.3.1. Implications for industrial waste management
In the previous section, we observed that there is no overall spatial
correlation of MSW logistics efﬁciency between prefectures and that
inefﬁciency of waste logistics is mainly due to the local geographical
characteristics of the prefectures. Ichinose and Yamamoto [8] show
that there is no strong global spatial autocorrelation of the volume
of illegal dumping detected in Japan.21 See SOP [12] for more details.
22 The importance of increasing or clearly deﬁning the role of the private sector is
noted by many practitioners, as summarized in Yoshida [16].
Table 9
Data for other variables.
Prefecture Inhabited
remote islands
(number)a
Paved
road ratio
(%)b
Population
(thousand
people)c
Area
(km2)d
Population
density
(people
per km2)e
Hokkaido 6 64.3 5508 83,457 66
Aomori 0 67.8 1373 9645 142
Iwate 0 60.5 1331 15,279 87
Miyagi 9 75.7 2348 6862 342
Akita 0 67.6 1086 11,636 93
Yamagata 1 82.0 1169 6652 176
Fukushima 0 69.4 2029 13,783 147
Ibaraki 0 64.2 2969 6096 487
Tochigi 0 83.4 2007 6408 313
Gunma 0 70.0 2008 6362 316
Saitama 0 70.3 7195 3768 1910
Chiba 0 83.2 6217 5082 1223
Tokyo 13 88.3 13,162 2103 6259
Kanagawa 0 90.8 9050 2416 3746
Niigata 2 77.5 2375 10,364 229
Toyama 0 90.2 1093 2046 534
Ishikawa 1 89.7 1170 4186 280
Fukui 0 91.7 807 4190 192
Yamanashi 0 84.0 863 4201 205
Nagano 0 71.6 2153 13,105 164
Gifu 0 82.9 2081 9768 213
Shizuoka 1 84.1 3765 7255 519
Aichi 3 90.0 7409 5116 1448
Mie 6 78.8 1855 5762 322
Shiga 0 91.7 1410 3767 374
Kyoto 0 82.5 2637 4613 572
Osaka 0 95.6 8863 1898 4670
Hyogo 6 84.9 5589 8396 666
Nara 0 81.7 1400 3691 379
Wakayama 0 86.0 1001 4726 212
Tottori 0 91.7 588 3507 168
Shimane 4 80.0 716 6708 107
Okayama 15 81.6 1945 7010 277
Hiroshima 14 88.5 2861 8480 337
Yamaguchi 21 93.2 1451 6114 237
Tokushima 2 80.2 786 4147 190
Kagawa 22 95.1 996 1862 535
Ehime 33 86.5 1431 5678 252
Kochi 2 84.8 765 7105 108
Fukuoka 8 85.7 5073 4845 1047
Saga 7 95.3 850 2440 348
Nagasaki 54 90.6 1427 4105 348
Kumamoto 6 89.8 1817 7268 250
Okinawa 40 86.4 1393 2276 612
Oita 7 91.4 1196 5100 235
Miyazaki 3 84.9 1135 6795 167
Kagoshima 28 88.7 1706 9044 189
Okinawa 40 86.4 1393 2276 612
Source:
a[14].
bRoads in Japan 2009, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.
cNational Census 2010, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
dGeographical Survey Institute 2010, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
Tourism.
ePopulation density is calculated by dividing “Population” by “Area”.
Table 8
Tobit results of inefﬁciency scores.
Original data Modiﬁed DEA
CRS Input-VRS Output-VRS Input-VRS Output-VRS
Public share of
HSW collection
0.5971b 0.6063b 0.5808b 0.0965b 0.5047b
(0.2405) (0.2613) (0.2708) (0.0446) (0.2330)
Public share of
workers
−0.9109 −1.559b −1.517a −0.2412a −0.6918
(0.5741) (.7459) (0.7647) (.1269) (0.5942)
Number of
inhabited islands
0.0064b 0.0076c 0.0072c 0.0014c 0.0061b
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0026) (.0004) (0.0024)
Pavement ratio −0.4486 −0.5192 −0.3889 −0.0325 −0.4142
(0.3504) (0.3656) (0.3781) (.0657) (0.3829)
Population density −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.00001 −0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.0001)
Log likelihood −3.0124 −4.7885 −5.7633 21.0059 −3.2208
Pseudo R2 0.7770 0.6969 0.6385 −1.0572 0.7616
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Results for the constant term are
omitted from the above table.
a Indicates 10% signiﬁcance.
b Indicates 5% signiﬁcance.
c Indicates 1% signiﬁcance.
Table 10
Prefectures with ten or more inhabited islands.
Source: Yamaguchi [14] and National Census (2005).
Prefecture Number of inhabited
islands
Population/island Land area/island
(km2)
Nagasaki 54 2882 29.04
Okinawa 40 3246 25.45
Ehime 33 525 2.71
104 D. Ichinose et al. / IATSS Research 36 (2013) 98–105Our next question is if there is any relationship between waste lo-
gistics and illegal dumping. Fig. 5 depicts the number of prefectures
suffering illegal dumping cases by volume. It is intuitive to assume
that illegal dumping would increase if the transportation is inefﬁcient
which could be reﬂected on efﬁciency score. Because Japanese munic-
ipal solid waste is collected mostly for a small user charge, or even for
free, by a local government, illegal dumping of municipal solid waste
has never been a major policy issue. In contrast, a proper disposal of
industrial waste – which is usually more toxic – incurs cost to those
who emit it. Unlike municipal solid waste, a local government has
no responsibility to collect industrial waste, and the waste generators
are solely responsible for its proper disposal. As is explained in the
previous section, the local geographical features affect the MSW logis-
tics score. Thus we compare the MSW logistics score and illegal
dumping of industrial waste.
Table 11 shows estimation results of a Poisson regression on the
amount of illegal dumping of industrial waste23 by prefectures.
In Table 11, we focus mainly on the effect of the efﬁciency score
on illegal dumping. To equalize other conditions, however, we added
three other independent variables. The ﬁrst variable, WIDWaste, de-
notes a weighted sum of waste generation. For example, prefecture
i's WIDWaste, sayWIDi, is deﬁned as follows;
WIDi ¼∑
j
wijxj; ð1Þ
wherewij is the ij element of the spatial weightmatrix which is the in-
verse of the squared distance between the capital cities of prefectures i
and j, and xj is waste generation in prefecture j.24 Note that, following
previous literature on spatial econometrics, wjj is set to zero. IDWaste
is the waste generation of prefecture i and arable_land_ratio is the
ratio of arable land in a prefecture. This variable is added because, all
other things being equal, more illegal dumping incidents tend to be
observed if there is a place that facilitates dumping, such as crop ﬁelds.
As shown in Table 11, the efﬁciency score (original_CRS) is signif-
icantly negative, which means that the larger the score, the smaller
the amount of illegal dumping. Low efﬁciency implies relatively
poor transportation infrastructure available in the prefecture, which
further implies a higher cost of industrial waste collection. Illegal
dumping occurs if the cost of legal dumping is higher than that of23 Note that the amount of illegal dumping is the sum of the last ﬁve years (from 2006
to 2010) to alleviate the impact of large sites of illegal dumping in one year.
24 An alternative spatial weight matrix based on the queen-type contiguity is tested
and investigated, and the signs and signiﬁcance levels were the same as the results
presented below which are robust.
Kagoshima 28 6522 89.40
Kagawa 22 366 2.90
Yamaguchi 21 238 3.08
Okayama 15 222 2.08
Hiroshima 14 1174 6.06
Tokyo 13 2211 27.74
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Fig. 5. Histogram of illegal dumping by prefecture.
105D. Ichinose et al. / IATSS Research 36 (2013) 98–105illegal dumping, resulting in a higher frequency of illegal dumping.
Our estimation results support the ﬁnding that inefﬁcient waste
logistics in MSW likely leads to more illegal dumping. Furthermore,
the signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient of WIDWaste simply means that
there would be more illegal dumping if the neighboring prefectures
generate more industrial waste, which is intuitive and consistent
with previous literature, such as Ichinose and Yamamoto [8].
5. Conclusions
This paper measured the productive efﬁciency of the municipal
solid waste (MSW) collection in Japan by applying DEA, the data
envelopment analysis, to cross-sectional data of the ﬁscal year 2009
made available by the Ministry of the Environment of Japan. Our
data include four outputs and four inputs for all 47 prefectures in
Japan. The outputs are the volumes of household solid waste (HSW)
and business solid waste (BSW) collected by both private and public
operators, whereas the numbers of trucks and workers used by pri-
vate and public operators are used as inputs. Either through public
operations or by contracting or licensing private waste collection op-
erators, prefectural governments possess the fundamental authority
over waste-processing operations in Japan. Therefore, we estimate a
multi-input multi-output production efﬁciency at the prefectural
level via DEA, employing several different model settings.
The results consistently show that the Ehime prefecture, followed
immediately by Nagasaki, is the least-efﬁcient prefecture, which indi-
cates that geographical characteristics, such as the number of inhabited
remote islands, are relativelymore dominant factors of efﬁciency.While
the implication that in these small islands' minimum efﬁcient scale
of production is not achieved is in line with literature suggesting thatTable 11
Estimation result (dependent variable: amount of illegal dumping (tons)).
Variable Coefﬁcient (Std. err.)
WIDWaste 3.95e−05a (6.08e−08)
IDWaste −1.31e−07a (3.20e−10)
original_CRS −2.18a (0.015)
arable_land_ratio 0.0047a (0.00257)
Intercept 11.3a (0.0144)
N 47
a 1%.waste logistics has increasing returns at the municipal level, our results
indicate that the production of waste collection in Japan is well de-
scribed as CRS technology at the prefectural level.
Through the regression of the measured efﬁciency scores of the
public participation ratios, we have shown that prefectures with a
higher private-sector participation measured in terms of HSW collec-
tion are more efﬁcient. At the same time, the regression results indi-
cate that the higher proportion of labor in the private sector implies
lower productive efﬁciency. This result provides empirical evidence
to advocate more private participation in reverse logistics, provided
that the labor productivity of private operators is sufﬁciently high.
We also provide evidence that the prefectures that are inefﬁcient in
MSW logistics tend to observe higher volumes of illegal dumping of
industrial waste. Because the restoration of illegal dumping sites is
costly, more investments in inefﬁcient DMUs help minimize the cost
of waste management policy.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iatssr.2013.01.002.
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